In addition to several crystals grown via the transition of solid I to II, three crystals of benezene II were grown in the diamond cell from the melt at approximately 315?C and -30 kb. They were cooled to room temperature, and x-ray data were collected on each crystal. Although the cell parameters were identical, each crystal gave data inconsistent with that from the crystal grown from the solid state. Specifically, hOl reflections with I-odd were present-an apparent violation of the extinctions of the space group, P21/c, assigned to benzene II. Moreover, the diffraction patterns showed an apparent mmm symmetry.
In benzene II, the three reciprocal vectors ending at the nodes-001, 010, 201-are perpendicular to each other to within experimental error. These vectors define an end-centered cell with orthorhombic metric symmetry (Fig.  11 ). These facts can be explained if we assume that benzene II, when grown from the liquid, is twinned by pseudomerohedry. In Fig. 11 the twin mirror plane is indicated by a dashed line, and it contains b* and the 201 reflection. With this mirror, the hOl reflections with /-odd can be generated by reflection from the hOl reflections with leven. Thus the 100 lattice node reflects into the 101 node. If the two individuals of the twin are present in nearly equal quantities, apparent Laue symmetry mmm would be generated.
In benzene II, the three reciprocal vectors ending at the nodes-001, 010, 201-are perpendicular to each other to within experimental error. These vectors define an end-centered cell with orthorhombic metric symmetry (Fig.  11) . These facts can be explained if we assume that benzene II, when grown from the liquid, is twinned by pseudomerohedry. In Fig. 11 the twin mirror plane is indicated by a dashed line, and it contains b* and the 201 reflection. With this mirror, the hOl reflections with /-odd can be generated by reflection from the hOl reflections with leven. Thus the 100 lattice node reflects into the 101 node. If the two individuals of the twin are present in nearly equal quantities, apparent Laue symmetry mmm would be generated. Among the numerous events recognized as trigger mechanisms for earthquakes, only two can be attributed to the activity of man-underground nuclear explosions and the injection of fluids into deep wells (1-3). The association of earthquakes with underground nuclear explosions has been explored in some detail during the past 2 years.
In an examination of records from the University of Nevada's seismographic station network, Boucher et al. (2) found that large underground nu-
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Twinning was not observed in the crystals grown by the transformation from solid I to solid II. In this case, the cell parameters-at the temperature and pressure of the transformation-may deviate sufficiently from a metric orthorhombic lattice so that the probability of twinning is reduced. 11 ( Abstract. Underground nuclear explosions trigger significant earthquake activity for at least 32 hours afterward and to distances up to at least 860 kilometers. The proposed Amchitka test may be used to study the feasibility of employing high-yield underground nuclear explosions to release stresses accumulating in the lithosphere. Periodical explosions along active fault zones may be used to prevent
Underground Nuclear Explosions and the Control of Earthquakes
Abstract. Underground nuclear explosions trigger significant earthquake activity for at least 32 hours afterward and to distances up to at least 860 kilometers. The proposed Amchitka test may be used to study the feasibility of employing high-yield underground nuclear explosions to release stresses accumulating in the lithosphere. Periodical explosions along active fault zones may be used to prevent underground explosions trigger earthquakes up to about 32 hours afterward. The data available to us show that in the 32-hour interval after the explosions there were 228 earthquakes, or an increase of about 62 percent over the expected number of 141.
By dividing the area under consideration into several annuli and by comparing, within each annulus, observed versus expected number of earthquakes, we have verified that the seismic effect of the explosions extends to the 860-km limit of our search. It may still be noticeable at greater distances.
While it is clear from the availaable evidence that man can affect earthquake activity, Carter (5) reports on conflicting views and feelings among scientists, engineers, and politicians regarding the proposed underground nuclear test at Amchitka Island, Alaska. There is some concern that this test may trigger an earthquake as disastrous as that of 1964 and some propose to limit underground nuclear tests to lowyield systems or to ban them altogether.
It would seem to us that properly spaced and properly timed deep underground nuclear tests could be used, possibly together with previous fluid injection in appropriate quantities, to release stresses in the lithosphere and therefore limit the severity of earthquakes. Stress in the lithosphere is built up by convection in the upper mantle, energized mainly by radioactive decay. It is to be expected that the longer the stress builds up, the more severe will be the earthquake activity releasing it. If so, it might be convenient to place a number of high-yield (1 to 10 megaton) nuclear devices in deep (3000 to 5000 m) wells appropriately spaced (20 to 50 km) along an active fault zone and release the accumulated stress by activating the de--s. '"iis procedure could then be . . *.eo t appropriate time intervals . -5 ? irs), thus preventing large o accumulation and disastrous earthquakes.
The proposed Amchitka test provides an excellent opportunity to evaluate our suggestion, if the nuclear device will be placed at sufficient depth and if the test were to be followed a few months later by a second identical test 'at the same location and depth. If nuclear devices have indeed a pounderground explosions trigger earthquakes up to about 32 hours afterward. The data available to us show that in the 32-hour interval after the explosions there were 228 earthquakes, or an increase of about 62 percent over the expected number of 141.
The proposed Amchitka test provides an excellent opportunity to evaluate our suggestion, if the nuclear device will be placed at sufficient depth and if the test were to be followed a few months later by a second identical test 'at the same location and depth. If nuclear devices have indeed a potential for earthquake activity control, the second test should trigger much less activity than the first one.
While the western end of the Aleutian Island Arc appears to be an ex-1256 tential for earthquake activity control, the second test should trigger much less activity than the first one.
While the western end of the Aleutian Island Arc appears to be an ex-1256 cellent laboratory to test the feasibility of using nuclear devices for earthquake control, actual application should exclude all inhabited seismic areas which have been free of major earthquakes for 25 years or more and should be initiated in areas recently (less than 10 years) affected by major seismic activity. It should then be continued at appropriate time intervals ( 
